Maneka Gandhi v. UOI- Case Brief
- shrey singh
- Apr 9, 2020
- 9 min read
Maneka Gandhi v Union of India
1978 AIR 597 decided on 25/01/1978
Bench: Hameedullah Beg (CJI), Y.V.Chandrachud, P.N Bhagwati, V.R. Krishna Iyer, N.L.Untwalia, S.M. Fazal Ali and P.S.Kailasam, JJ.
Facts
The passport of the petitioner was impounded “in public interest” by an order and the Government of India having declined “in the interests of general public” to furnish to her the reasons for its decision, she filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the order on the grounds that it violated Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.
Operative Part
The Supreme Court disposing of the writ petition and without interfering with the impugned order of impounding of passport said that the Government is agreeable to consider any representation that may be made by the petitioner in respect of impounding of her passport and giving her an opportunity in the matter at an early date and to deal with the representation of the petitioner expeditiously in accordance with law.
Question of Law
Whether the executive have the power to impound the passport of petitioner?
Held
The Supreme Court held that the position which obtained prior to the coming into force of the Passports Act, 1967 was that there was no law regulating the issue of passports for leaving the shores of India and going abroad. The issue of passports was entirely within the discretion of the executive and this discretion was unguided and unchannelled. The Supreme Court by a majority in Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarthnam, [(1967) 3 SCR 525], held that the expression “personal liberty” in Article 21 takes in the right of locomotion and travel abroad and hence no person can be deprived of that right except according to the procedure established by law and since no law has been made by the State regulating or prohibiting the exercise of the right, the refusal of passport was in violation of Article 21 and the discretion being unchannelled and arbitrary was violative of Article 14. This decision was accepted by Parliament and the infirmity was set right by the enactment of the Passports Act.
After the enactment of Passport Act, 1967, Section 10(3) of the Act provides that the passport authority may impound or cause to be impounded or revoke a passport or a travel document on the grounds set out in clauses (a) to (h). Clause (c) provides that such action may be taken if the passport authority deems it necessary so to do in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of India, friendly relations of India with foreign countries or in the interests of general public. In the present case, the passport was impounded on the ground that it was in the interests of general public. Sub-section (5) requires the passport authority compounding the passport to record in writing a brief statement of reasons for making such order and furnish to the holder of the passport, on demand, a copy of the same unless in any case that the passport authority is of the opinion that it will not be, inter alia, in the interests of general public to furnish such a copy.
Question of Law
Whether S. 10(3)(c) of Passport Act, 1967 is violative of Art 14?
Held
Section 10(3)(c) is not violative of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution and particularly Article 14. It is well settled that when a statute vests an unguided and unrestricted power in an authority to affect the rights of a person without laying down any policy or principle which is to guide the authority in exercise of the power, it would be affected by the vice of discrimination. But in the present case, the ground of “in the interests of general public” is not vague or undefined. These words have a clearly well defined meaning and the courts have often been called upon to decide whether a particular action is in the interests of the general public or in public interest and no difficulty has been experienced by the courts in carrying out this exercise. These words are borrowed from Article 19(5) of the Constitution and if they were not vague and undefined in that article, it is difficult to see how they can be condemned as such when they occur in Section 10(3)(c). It must, therefore, be held that certain guidelines are provided by the words “in the interests of general public” and the power conferred on the passport authority to impound a passport cannot be said to be unguided or unfettered. Moreover, the exercise of the power is not made to depend on the subjective opinion of the authority but the authority is required to record in writing a brief statement of reasons and to supply a copy of such statement to the person affected. It is true that when the order is made by the Central Government there is no appeal against it. But then in such a case the power is exercised by the Central Government itself and it can safely be assumed that the Central Government will exercise the power in a reasonable and responsible manner. When power is vested in a high authority the abuse of it cannot be lightly assumed and in any event if there is abuse of power, the arms of the court are long enough to reach it and strike it down. The power conferred on the passport authority to impound the passport under Section 10(3)(c) cannot, therefore, be regarded as discriminatory and it does not fall foul of Article 14. But every exercise of such power has to be tested in order to determine whether it is arbitrary or within the guidelines provided by Section 10(3)(c).
Question of Law
Whether Art 14, 19 and 21 are interlinked?
Held
Article 21 occurs in Part III of the Constitution which confers certain fundamental rights. Articles 14 to 18 occur under the heading “Right to Equality” and of them by far the most important is Article 14 which confers a fundamental right by injuncting the State not to deny any person equality before the law or equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. Articles 19 to 22 find place under the heading “Right to Freedom” and Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. Though the article is couched in negative language, it confers the fundamental right to life and liberty. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that it lays down the circumstances under which a passport may be issued or refused or cancelled or impounded and also prescribes the procedure for doing so. Obviously the procedure cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable. Fundamental rights conferred by Part III are not distinct and mutually exclusive. A law depriving a person of personal liberty and prescribing a procedure for that purpose within the meaning of Article 21 has to stand a test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 which may be applicable in a given situation. Ex-hypothesi it must also be likely to be tested with reference to Article 14. On principle, the concept of reasonableness must, therefore, be projected in the procedure contemplated by Article 21 having regard to the impact of Article 14 on Article 21.
Law wrt to Natural Justice
Any procedure which permits impairment of the constitutional right to go abroad without giving a reasonable opportunity to show cause cannot but be condemned as unfair and unjust and hence there is, in the present case, clear infringement of the requirement of Article 21. Even when the statute is silent, the law may, in a given case, make an implication and apply the principle of audi alteram partem. The principle of the maxim which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard is part of the rules of natural justice. When the test of applicability of the doctrine of natural justice is that for fairness in action an opportunity to be heard should be given to the affected person, there can be no distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function. The aim of both is to arrive at a just decision and if the rule of natural justice is calculated to secure justice, or, to put it negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable to quasi-judicial enquiries only and not to an administrative enquiry. Sometimes an unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have far more serious consequences than a decision of a quasi-judicial enquiry and hence the rules of natural justice must apply equally in an administrative enquiry which entails civil consequences. The law must be taken to be well-settled that even in an administrative proceeding which involve civil consequences the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable. In the present case, the power conferred on the passport authority is to impound a passport and the consequences of impounding the passport would be to impair the constitutional right of the holder of the passport to go abroad during the time the passport is impounded. Moreover, a passport can be impounded only on certain specified grounds set out in Section 10(3) of the Passports Act and the passport authority would have to apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of the given case and decide whether any of those grounds exist which would justify the impounding. The authority is also required by sub-section (5) to record in writing a brief statement of the reasons for making an order of impounding and save in certain exceptional circumstances it is obliged to furnish a copy of the statement of reasons to the holder of the passport. A right to appeal against the order is given by Section 11 and in the appeal the validity of the reasons given by the passport authority can be canvassed before the Appellate Authority. The rules of natural justice would, in the circumstances, be applicable in the exercise of the power of impounding a passport.
In the present case, however, the Central Government not only did not give an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner after making the impugned order but even declined to furnish the reasons for such impounding. The order of impounding was, therefore, clearly in violation of the rule of natural justice but in view of the statement of the Attorney-General assuring expeditious consideration of any representation that may be made by the petitioner, the vice is removed and it can no longer be assailed on the ground that it does not comply with the audi alterem partem rule.
Question of Law
Whether ‘right to travel abroad’ is contained in Art 19 and 21?
Held
The Court said that Right to travel abroad not included in Article 19(1) (a) or (g) but under Art. 21. The Court further held that it is possible that a right does not find an express mention in any clause of Article 19(1) and yet be covered by some clause of the article as, for example, freedom of the press is covered by Article 19(1)(a) though not specifically mentioned therein. Thus, even if a right is not specifically mentioned in Article 19(1), it may still be a fundamental right covered by some of the articles, but only if it is an integral part of a named fundamental right or par takes the same basic nature and character as that fundamental right. It is not enough that a right claimed by the petitioner flows or emanates from a named fundamental right or that its existence is necessary in order to make the exercise of the named fundamental right meaningful and effective. Every activity which facilitates the exercise of a named fundamental right is not necessarily comprehended in that fundamental right nor can it be regarded as such merely because it may not be possible otherwise to effectively exercise that fundamental right. The contrary construction would lead to incongruous results and the entire scheme of Article 19(1) which confers different rights and sanctions different restrictions according to different standards depending upon the nature of the right will be upset. What is necessary to be seen is, and of the test which must be applied, whether the right claimed by the petitioner is an integral part of the fundamental right or partakes of the same basic nature and character as the named fundamental right so that the exercise of such right is in reality and substance nothing but an instance of the exercise of the named fundamental right.
In Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam (1967) 3 SCR 525, the Supreme Court ruled by majority that the expression “personal liberty” which occurs in Article 21 of the Constitution includes the right to travel abroad and no person can be deprived of that right except according to procedure established by law. The Passports Act which was enacted by Parliament in 1967 in order to comply with that decision prescribes the procedure whereby an application for a passport may be granted fully or partially, with or without endorsement and a passport once granted may later be revoked or impounded; but the mere prescription of some kind of procedure cannot ever meet the mandate of Article 21. The procedure prescribed by law has to be fair, just and reasonable, not fanciful, oppressive of arbitrary.
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